Introduction
Electricity has a dual character, it is both a good as well as a service, which usually leads to a great level of government involvement and its supply has some unique characteristics. Unlike other goods and services it is not possible, under regular working conditions, to keep it in stock, ration it or have consumers queue for it. Due to the benefits of efficiently management of supply and demand and from higher efficiencies of economies of scale, the power sector is believed to be a natural monopoly. The organisation of the power sector was based both on vertically integrated monopolies and tight regulations that left no room for market forces. The fundamentals of this organization were based on the monopoly nature of the power sector. This meant that electricity generation; transmission and distribution were less costly when carried out by a single integrated firm than when performed by several firms. The scale of economies supported this organisation around vertically integrated utilities.
Delhi's system of state regulated private electric utility monopolies
To benefit from increased efficiencies from privatisation and private incentive, like reduction in AT&C (aggregate technical & commercial) losses (includes losses due to electricity theft and energy wastage due to heating of wires), in 2002 the Delhi Government privatised the Electricity distribution through 49-51 partnership with Tata Power and Reliance Infra with the private companies getting the 51% and thus companies had the control over the business management but the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (referred to as Regulator) essentially controls the selling price of each unit power they sell and also the price of power they purchase from the power producers. These companies are in a very serious financial and liquidity crunch and are heavily indebted on costly borrowings from the banks. The total debt of Delhi Distribution companies is around Rs 6000 crores.
Only recently has the electricity tariff been revised so that these companies can break even and repay their creditors. 
Liberalisation of the electricity sector in the United States and United

Kingdom
In the US, the power industry was made almost entirely of private investment and traditionally property rights enjoy strong protection. Regulations that protected competition were ineffective when applied to the monopolies resulting from past regulations. Hence the electricity sector was liberalised with much more alertness of and provision to counter the problem that too much influence of a single company could lead to consumer exploitation 6 . Liberalisation in the US has always tried to safeguard the affordability of resulting power tariffs. A careful relaxation of regulatory controls has been done with significant awareness of the problems that misuse of the market power can result in. 7 Regulatory failure to reduce costs was the primary cause of liberalisation of the sector toward retail competition in the US.
Economic considerations were the driving force in the process towards retail competition. Specifically, high mean prices indicated of potentially large welfare gains from competition.
In the United Kingdom, restructuring and privatisation of the power industry among many generation companies competing was done to form a wholesale market. Every consumer was then allowed the right of choice of supplier, inducing retail competition. Distribution and transmission continued to be regulated activities, replacing return on investment with regulation (Similar to Delhi), by incentive and  A spot market and also futures market in electricity is well established in some countries.
 Deregulation of wholesale power prices paid by large consumers Small and medium consumers are captives of the licensed distribution companies. They cannot change their supplier in case of low reliability or poor quality service.
 The lack of competition among retailers and choice for small and medium consumers leads to regulation that is needed to protect them.
What enabled retail competition to be possible? Consumers (commercial, industrial The ease with which small-scale generators can be absorbed in the transmission network and price effectiveness with larger scale units makes competition in generation segment economically viable.
Characteristics of the Retail Competition Model
The basic model is characterized by the fact that it permits all consumers to choose their generator, either directly or through their choice of retailer. Generation is deregulated with free entrance and exit, and regulation does not impose capacity requirements on generators.
Similar to other sectors power retailers buy electricity in the wholesale package and market it to meet consumer demands. Their survival and profits depend on their capability to satisfy consumer preferences, consequently, promoting low prices and the development of new products to increase efficiency. Retail companies compete within the service territory formerly served by the local distribution company which remains the exclusive provider of wire services but is not allowed to compete with retail companies in supplying services like power retail and risk management.
Both the generation and retail sale functions are deregulated and open to competition. Generating companies sell power to electricity retailers or directly to customers, instead of to a local distributor with a licensed monopoly. Power retailers or marketers would buy power from generators and sometimes resell it to retail customers, bundled with energy management services.
Licensed companies would provide transportation and distribution services in order to take advantage of economies of scale in these segments. However, these companies must provide open access or common carriage to all consumers, and are regulated to avoid monopolistic behaviour.
The retail model requires a spot market to enable multilateral trading. Competitive retail needs open access to distribution and transmission wires. This in turn requires that prices must be set for both these services. They must also provide appropriate returns to the owners of the wires.
Independent companies should provide distribution and transmission services. This solves the problem of discrimination among different consumers and discourages cross-subsidies, which is a major concern of pure retail companies.
13
There would be two types of fees, the access fee and the regular fee. The access fee covers the cost of 
Distribution and Retailing Separation:
Power retail and power distribution is two separate functions. Power retail is the business of buying power from generators or in the spot market and reselling it to final customers. Distribution is the service of carrying electricity from the transmission and distribution network to the consumer. 13,14 Feunte, C and Baeto, P. 1999, Retail Competition in Electricity, Washington, D.C., March 1999C N° IFM118 Researching Reality Internship Centre for Civil Society Distribution wires must be operated separately from retail because selling wire services (services that allows access to distribution network) will still be a monopolised and a regulated business, whereas retail is open to competition because a distribution utility providing both services may cross-subsidise and discriminate between consumers buying only wires and consumers buying both power and wires.
Allowing distribution companies in retailing may reduce market competition and increase market power of distribution companies as they may subsidise their retail consumers by levying a wire services charge higher than the cost to their captive consumers, or in cases of connection damage, the distribution company will have greater incentives to fix those servicing its own customers first. This sort of situations should be handled by regulators in order to prevent a failure of competition within their distribution territory.
The distribution company may also discriminate between both classes of customers. For example, in cases of wire damage, the distribution company will have greater incentives to fix those servicing its own customers first. This sort of situations should be handled by regulators in order to prevent a failure of competition. Nevertheless, most of the companies being restructured own the wires and sell the electricity at the retail level. This may be the reason that only a few customers seek retailers other than their distribution companies 15 .
As seen in other sectors like agriculture and banking, parties involved, especially the large consumers and power generating companies would be ready to pay a premium to hedge the risks and variability of price in the spot market and would engage in futures contracts to mitigate price volatility. Competition would lead to risk being borne by party who is able to manage it the best. Since the major source of risks are the fuel price fluctuations and changes in consumption patterns many types of derivatives contracts would be offered by companies resulting in effective risk management
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Conclusion
As seen with almost every other sector, free markets and competition, over the long term reduces costs, increases efficiency through innovation and leads to a lot of consumer welfare. Even in the power sector this has now become possible, however due to the nature of the industry ensuring fair competition is rather tricky and regulation is needed to make market competition work effectively and avoid concentration of market power. Retail competition is extremely feasible in Delhi, with three monopolies already existing in the distribution segment; the government can allow different and competing companies to retail power through the present distribution network. The existence of an active regulator like the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission would greatly help in protecting competition when actually applying a similar model as suggested in the study.
